“Death Is Nothing To Us: Epicurus’ Blunder

Epicurus describes in his Letter Menoeceus his philosophy on happiness and the attitude Epicureans ought to have towards the gods, as well as death. Epicurus said, “”…death means nothing to me” (125). This was in response to his Sense Experience Argument as well as Unnecessary Suffering Argument. Epicurus bases his arguments on the idea that death is “…the absense of life (125), not a momentary death. Epicurus appears to ignore the inextricable connection between permanent death and the moment of dying. Epicurus argues that ‘death’ is a combination of the momentary act and permanent state. Both arguments will be shown to be unsound, even though they are valid in deductive terms. Epicurus is accepted for this paper as having a hedonist view of pleasure.

This paper is not able to evaluate Epicurus’s teleological views on the gods. It will be shown that Epicurus Sense-Experience argument and Unnecessary paie Argument are both valid and conclude that Death cannot be a ‘nothing. Death should only be feared when the pain of the momentary act is greater than that caused by fearing or anticipating death. The momentary act is only pleasurable if there is no pain. The Sense Experience Argument and Unnecessary-Pain Argument of Epicurus are first reconstructed. Additional textual references will be added, and the arguments will then briefly be evaluated. The conclusion of the preceding paragraph will then be shown.

Sense-Experience argument 1) “All “…goodness and evilness is in the sense-experience of things” (124). 2) “Death robs us of our sense-experience.” (124). Death is neither bad nor good. This Sense Experience Argument is valid deductively. His later comments on pain and pleasure can help clarify Premise 1. Epicurus defines pleasure, which is the absence from pain, as good. Since we only perceive good and evil through our sense-experiences, good and wrong are both based on sense-experience. Epicurus clarifies, “Pain is “…pain or disturbance of the soul in the body” (131). Epicurus explains that pleasure is the “…first inborn good (129). In order to further clarify the second proposition, we can also look at Epicurus’ definition: “…absence. Absence from life is more than just a temporary act of dying. Premise 1 can be proved true but Premise 2 cannot. The Sense-Experience Argument is therefore invalid. Premise 2 only holds true if Epicurus’s suggestion that the momentary act and permanent state of dying are completely separate is false. Since these two are inextricably related and it’s impossible to achieve permanent death without experiencing either pain or pleasure, death must either be accompanied by a positive or negative sensory experience. Premise 2 therefore is false and the Sense Experience argument is not sound.

Epicurus extends Sense-Experience to Unnecessary Fear Argument, based on his belief that death does not cause pain. B) A thing that is not distressing when it’s present can cause unnecessary pain when it’s anticipated (125). C) Anticipating death causes unnecessary pain (125). Deductively, the Unnecessary Pain argument is valid but not sound. Premise A has been deemed incorrect as it is based on Premise 2 which is Epicurus Sense Experiment Argument. In the same way that it may not be true that the act of dying must include a brief moment of experiencing sense-experience, it also isn’t true that the death will always be painless. Premise A will also be refuted because it is not true that death always causes no pain or distress. Thus, both the Unnecessary Pain and Sense-Experience arguments are refuted. These arguments are shown to be false, leading us to conclude that death is either good or evil depending on the circumstances of an individual. (Refuting Conclusioin 3). It may also be advantageous to an individual to anticipate their death. (Refuting Conclusioin C). By examining the strongest arguments against Premise 1 of Sense-Experience, we can show that it is true. This leads us to conclude that both the good and bad are a result of sense experience. The removal of pain by death can be argued to be good, while the removal pleasure is considered bad. The removal of pain from a person’s life, whether it be the mental, emotional, or physical pain caused by a life in solitary confinement, or chronic pain due to excruciating health problems, may be considered a good thing. It is bad to suffer, so staying alive can be bad as well. In this case, it is not good to remain alive because of the pain.

Epicurus states that the wise “… enjoys not only the longest period of time, but also the most pleasant. (126). If one’s life was doomed to be utterly painful and devoid pleasure, it seems that death would be the easiest (least painful). This argument is not valid. Since death can never be perceived as a state of bliss, it is far worse than any painful life. Hence, the only place where good can exist is in life. This is because sense experiences and some pleasure are possible. Death is also better than a life that is full of pleasure, because it prevents the individual from experiencing pain. In this scenario, bad could only exist as a result of the sensory experience, which is the life. Premise 1 has been proven true. Premise 2 is not true because the momentary experience of dying must be painful or pleasurable in order to reach the permanent state. The momentary act that is dying must be painful or enjoyable, and this can only be achieved through sense-experience. Therefore, death, including the permanent state, is not the absence of sense-experience. It is reasonable to expect that some people’s moments of death will be painful. Epicurus’ view of evil says that death is bad when it is painful. This should make us fearful. A person’s dying moments could be enjoyable. The lesser pain experienced by a dying person could distract them from the greater physical pain, or the greater soul pain.

Epicurus deemed the absence or pain as pleasure. The absence of some pain in the mind, body, and soul due to distraction from lesser pain may be pleasurable. The dying moment can be painful or pleasurable. Once the permanent death state has started, sense-experience will stop. Premise 2 therefore is false. The permanent state death is the privation or sense-experience. Premise A derives from Premise 2 and is therefore untrue. The argument seems to suggest that death, while bad, should only cause fear if dying in the present moment is painful. Alternatively death would be good and not a reason for concern if dying in the present moment is pleasant due the a reduction of pain. This is because the Premise C of the Unnecessary Fear Argument also does not hold true, as fearing death in its permanent state, which has no pain, can cause people to avoid painful acts of dying. Epicurus writes that it’s okay to be afraid of the momentary act but not of the permanent state. Epicurus thinks it foolish that people fear death in its permanent form, even though they may avoid the pain of dying momentarily. This individual will only be able to avoid this momentary act of dying by anticipating the permanent state. This anticipation can’t be denied, as it will cause mental pain and a “…disturbance on the soul.

The mere possibility of avoiding a painful death by anticipating it is enough to disprove the validity of the B-premise. We can conclude that fearing death and the anticipation of death are bad things. A momentary act that is painless is more pleasurable than a death that is painful. Epicurus wants death to be defined as “…the death of life”, as he states immediately after his Sense Experience Argument (125). However, this does not take into account the fact that death is a constant state of death and can only occur at a particular moment. This definition would make Epicurus’ Sense Experience Argument and Unnecessary-Pain Argument valid and deductively sound.

Both arguments are invalid, though, because it is not possible to reach the permanent state death without experiencing a moment of dying. The dying moment is experienced as pain or pleasure by the individual while still conscious and alive. “It is impossible for “…death to be nothing in our eyes” (124). Epicurus can claim that Death is Nothing to Us once we have reached the permanent death state.